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Abstract: Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of 
divine omniscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all 
truths—is false. We here focus on two such arguments: the set theoretic argu-
ment and the semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run parallel to, 
respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. It is beyond 
the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are successful argu-
ments against the classical doctrine of omniscience. What we are here interested 
in is a way in which these arguments can be generalized. In particular, we show 
how generalizations of these arguments can target, explicitly, alternatives to the 
classical doctrine of omniscience, including what we here call restricted omnis-
cience and open future open theism. As a corollary, considerations of Grim-style 
arguments do not support these alternatives to the classical doctrine of omnisci-
ence over the classical doctrine. We conclude that what is paradoxical is not the 
classical doctrine of omniscience just as such; rather, what is paradoxical is a 
core commitment shared by the classical doctrine and its more modest alterna-
tives, namely, the thesis that God is a perfectly logical reasoner. 
 
1. Introduction 
Patrick Grim advances arguments meant to show that the doctrine of divine om-
niscience—the classical doctrine according to which God knows all truths—is 
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false. In particular, we here have in mind to focus on two such arguments: the set 
theoretic argument and the semantic argument. These arguments due to Grim run 
parallel to, respectively, familiar paradoxes in set theory and naive truth theory. 
It is beyond the purview of this article to adjudicate whether or not these are 
successful arguments against the classical doctrine of omniscience. What we are 
here interested in is a way in which these arguments can be generalized.1 
 In this article, first, we are mainly concerned to show that Grim-style par-
adoxes arise given assumptions about God’s knowledge not nearly as strong as 
those imposed upon us by the classical doctrine of omniscience. As a result, we 
show that the paradoxes arise explicitly for weaker alternatives to the classical 
doctrine. In particular, the paradoxes arise for alternatives to the classical doc-
trine that fall under the broad rubrics of restricted omniscience and open theism. 
Several implications of this are briefly drawn out. Finally, we conclude by giving 
the main philosophical upshot, which will emerge over the course of this article: 
the paradoxes of omniscience need not primarily owe to strong assumptions 
about the extent of God’s knowledge, but can just as well be attributed to the 
logical perfection of God’s knowledge. What is paradoxical is not just the idea 
of a God-like knower, but also the constituent idea of a God-like logical reasoner, 
a being of perfect rationality from a logical point of view. 
 
2. Grim’s Paradoxes of Omniscience 
The classical doctrine of divine omniscience requires that God knows all truths.2 
Alternatively, this entailment of the classical doctrine can be formulated as the 
thesis that God believes all truths and believes no falsehoods. It is this latter for-
mulation that we assume in what follows. So, we will say that the classical doc-
trine entails two theses: 
NO FALSE: God believes no false propositions 
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ALL TRUE: God believes all true propositions 
Given this characterization of omniscience, God, as classically conceived, com-
prehensively believes all truths and completely disbelieves all falsehoods. We 
will focus on two arguments due to Grim aimed at showing that the classical 
doctrine gives rise to paradoxes, and is therefore false. 
 The first argument we call the set theoretic argument. If God believes all 
truths and disbelieves all falsehoods, then the set of all propositions God believes 
is just the set comprising all and only true propositions. But it can be shown that, 
on pain of contradiction, no such set exists. The argument is as follows: 
Suppose (i) there is a set S of all and only true propositions, (ii) for 
every set of true propositions P ⊆ 𝑆 there corresponds a true proposi-
tion p
P
—say, the proposition that all elements of P are true—and (iii) 




. Now, by the Axiom of 
Separation, there is a set R collecting all and only the true propositions 
of this sort that are not also members of their corresponding set, that is: 
R ={x ∈ S ∣ ∃P ⊆ S(x = p
P
 and x ∉ P)} 





 ∉ R. Then p
R
 is not an element of its corresponding set R. 
Since this is what it means for something to be an element of R, it fol-
lows that p
R
 ∈ R. So, discharging the assumption, we have shown 
p
R
 ∉ R only if p
R
 ∈ R, which implies p
R
 ∈ R. So, we know p
R
 ∈ R. 
Now, it follows by definition of R that for some P ⊆ S, pR = pP and 
p
R




. Contradiction. Therefore, 




Since there cannot be a set of propositions large enough to be the set of all prop-
ositions that God, according to the classical doctrine, believes, the classical doc-
trine is therefore false.4 
 The second argument is what we call the semantic argument.5 If God be-
lieves all truths and disbelieves all falsehoods, then any substitution instance of 
the following schema comes out true, where φ is a sentential variable and the 
biconditional is material: 
God believes that ⌜φ⌝ is true ↔ φ 
But then we immediately run into paradoxes concerning sentences such as 
1. God does not believe that (1) is true 
To see this, let us assume that we are working in a language with sufficient ex-
pressive richness to effect self-reference.6 Given a sentence φ of the language, 
we will use the quotation ⌜φ⌝ as a singular term for φ. (If you like, take ⌜φ⌝ to 
be a Gödel number of φ.) We also assume that among the predicates of the lan-
guage is a predicate God believes (___), as our regimentation of the open sen-
tence “God believes that ( . . . ) is true” of ordinary English. 
 Suppose the doctrine of divine omniscience is true. Then, any substitution 
of a sentence of our language for φ in the following schema comes out true: 
(O) God believes (⌜φ⌝) ↔ φ 
Because we have the resources for self-reference, our language will contain a 
sentence α of which the following holds: 
(α) α ↔ ¬God believes (⌜α⌝) 




 1) α ∨ ¬α        [Excluded middle]  
 2) α                  [Assume for CP]  
  2.1) ¬God believes (⌜α⌝)         [2; (α), MP]  
  2.2) α → God believes (⌜α⌝)        [Sub. (O), (→)]  
  2.3) ¬α          [2.1, 2.2; MT]  
  2.4) α ∧¬α        [2, 2.3; ∧-I]  
 3) α → (α ∧ ¬α)      [2-2.4; CP]  
 4) ¬α        [Assume for CP]  
  4.1) ¬¬God believes (⌜α⌝)    [4; (α), MP]  
  4.2) God believes (⌜α⌝)    [4.1; DN]  
  4.3) God believes (⌜α⌝) → α   [Sub. (O), (←)]  
  4.4) ¬God believes (⌜α⌝)    [4, 4.3; MT]  
  4.5) α       [4.4; (α), MP]  
  4.6) α ∧ ¬α      [4, 4.5; ∧-I]  
 5) ¬α → (α ∧ ¬α)      [4-4.6; CP]  
 6) α ∧ ¬α       [1, 3, 5; ∨-E]  
So, we see that accepting unrestricted substitution into the schema (O) above 
leads to a contradiction. But unrestricted substitution into the schema (O) is just 
a regimentation of the classical doctrine of divine omniscience: God believes 
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something if and only if it is true. The classical doctrine, according to Grim, is 
the culprit, and so the classical doctrine is false.7 
 
3. Alternatives to the Classical Doctrine 
The above arguments targeted the classical doctrine of divine omniscience. It is 
instructive, in considering Grim’s arguments, to see how they fare against alter-
natives to the classical view. The first such alternative is what we call open future 
open theism (henceforth, open theism, for short), which has been variously de-
fended by John Lucas, Dale Tuggy, Dean Zimmerman, and others.8 
 We are for present purposes taking open theism to be an alternative to the 
classical doctrine because open theism adds to it the following metaphysical the-
sis: 
OPEN: Some propositions are neither true nor false 
Typically, OPEN is filled out by adding the further elaboration, which we will here 
simply treat as characteristic of open theism: 
F-OPEN: Some propositions about the future are neither true nor false 
The niceties of open theism’s exact relation to either of OPEN or F-OPEN are not 
terribly important. What matters is that open theism adds some alethically pur-
gative thesis to the classical doctrine. 
 Differing from open theism is a family of alternative views we call re-
stricted omniscience. Recall that the classical doctrine has two components, to 
wit, NO FALSE and ALL TRUE. For our purposes, it will suffice to characterize a 
restricted omniscience view as any view that includes NO FALSE but rejects ALL 
TRUE in favor of some restriction thereof. 
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 There are diverse views that may be accordingly classified as restricted 
omniscience views, by the lights of this characterization. These are generated by 
adding some qualification to ALL TRUE9 which can be achieved by filling out the 
following schema for some suitable open sentence ψ: 
AT-SCHEMA: God believes all true propositions p such that ψ( .  .  .  p .  .  .  ) 
Given this, consider the following three instances of AT-SCHEMA:10 
AT-KNOWABLE: God believes all true propositions p such that p is know-
able to God 
AT-INDEXICAL: God believes all true propositions p such that p contains 
no first-person indexical information (about some being other than God 
Himself) 
AT-TEMPORAL: God believes all true propositions p such that p contains 
no temporally indexical information 
 If we for example add AT-KNOWABLE to NO FALSE we get something in 
the vicinity of the view advanced at various points by William Hasker, Richard 
Swinburne, and endorsed also by Peter van Inwagen, according to which God 
knows all truths that are knowable to him.11 A standard version of this view has 
it that God does not know some contingent truths about what free agents will 
freely do in the future. Call this view K-Restricted Omniscience. 
 Likewise, if we add to NO FALSE the thesis AT-INDEXICAL we arrive at a 
view motivated by arguments from Norman Kretzmann and Patrick Grim.12 Ac-
cording to this view, truths like those expressed by sentences containing pronom-
inal indexicals as, for example, “I am Norman Kretzmann,’’ are not a part of 
God’s knowledge, as they can only be known or believed by the individual her-




 Finally, what we will in the obvious way call T-Restricted Omniscience 
is the result of adding AT-TEMPORAL to NO-FALSE, resulting in a view motivated 
by arguments due to Arthur Prior, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Patrick 
Grim, and others.13 According to T-Restricted Omniscience, God does not know 
some truths involving temporally indexical information. An example of the latter 
might be propositions at different times expressed by the sentence “It is now cold 
in the sun room.” 
 How do these views, including possible combinations thereof, fare 
against Grim’s arguments? 
 The set theoretic argument applies to any doctrine that entails unrestricted 
ALL TRUE, and so it applies to open theism—open theism entails the conjunction 
of NO FALSE and ALL TRUE, with its distinctive implications arising from the par-
ticular metaphysical theses it adds to the classical doctrine. Open theism, though, 
does not bend under the weight of the semantic argument; at least, not if it is 
consistent. To see this, consider that any consistent view that entails OPEN re-
quires a denial of the principle of bivalence, according to which every proposition 
is either true or false. Correspondingly, the logic accompanying such a doctrine 
cannot be classical—it must be a logic that does not validate the law of excluded 
middle. But the law of excluded middle prominently figures in the above formu-
lation of the semantic argument. Given this, the consistent open theist will justly 
dismiss the semantic argument as presupposing a logic that she does not—indeed, 
cannot, on pain of inconsistency—accept.14 
 What, now, of the three restricted omniscience views we have sketched, 
including their combinations? As can easily be seen, both the set theoretic argu-
ment and the semantic argument presuppose the truth of unrestricted ALL TRUE. 
If God can fail to believe some truth, then the thesis that there is no set of all 
truths does not so much as suggest that there is no set of truths that God believes, 
and so the set theoretic argument is impotent against restricted omniscience 
views and their combinations alike. Likewise, if God fails to believe some truth 
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then some substitution for φ in the left-to-right direction of (O) is untrue, in which 
case the inference at stage 2.2 of the semantic argument is unjustified. 
 As we see, then, though Grim’s arguments apply to the classical doctrine 
they do not uniformly apply to alternatives to the classical doctrine. We will now 
show that strengthened versions of those arguments can be mobilized not only 
against the classical doctrine of divine omniscience but also against the substan-
tially weaker alternatives just mentioned. 
 
4. Paradoxes for the Alternative Doctrines 
In this section we state generalizations of Grim’s arguments. We then discuss 
how the generalized arguments apply to alternative doctrines of divine omnisci-
ence canvassed above. 
 
4.1 The Generalized Set Theoretic Argument 
The set theoretic argument targeted the claim that God believes all and only the 
truths by establishing that there is no set of all such truths—the supposition that 
there is a set of all truths results in a contradiction. This motivates a recipe for 
generating similar arguments against weaker alternatives to the classical doc-
trine: find a feature of propositions such that God, according to a given weak 
alternative to the classical doctrine, is supposed to know all truths with that fea-
ture, and show that there is no set of all truths having that feature. If such a feature 
can be found and if the corresponding Grim-style argument can be given then the 
parallel conclusion follows: these weaker alternatives to the classical doctrine are 
false. What follows is one such argument. 
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 For clarification, we note that in what immediately follows we use 
“truths” to mean true propositions, and by “self-identity,” used as a count noun, 
we mean a trivial identity proposition of the same sort as the proposition that 
2 = 2, the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus, etc. For obvious reasons, we 
also operationally take these truths to be indexical-free, tense-free, etc. 
Suppose (i) there is a set S of all and only true self-identities, (ii) for 
every set of true self-identities P ⊆ S there corresponds a true self-iden-
tity p
P
—say, the proposition that P is self-identical—and (iii) for every 
P, Q ⊆ S, if P ≠ Q, then p
P ≠ pQ. Now, by the Axiom of Separation, 
there is a set 𝑅 collecting all and only the true propositions of the latter 
sort knowable to God that are not also members of their corresponding 
set, that is: 
    R = {x ∈ S ∣ ∃P ⊆ S(x = p
P
 and x ∉ P)} 
Because R ⊆ S there is also a corresponding true proposition p
R
 know-
able to God. Assume pR ∉ R. Then pR is not an element of its corre-
sponding set R. Since this is what it means for something to be an ele-
ment of R, it follows that p
R
 ∈ R. So, discharging the assumption, we 
have shown p
R
 ∉ R only if p
R
 ∈ R, which implies p
R
 ∈ R. So, we know 
p
R












fore, there is no set S of all and only true self-identities. That is, (i) is 
false. 
 Since the original set theoretic argument applied to open theism besides 
also applying to the classical doctrine of omniscience, this argument, which just 
generalizes the former one, obviously applies to open theism just the same. This 
generalization of Grim’s set theoretic argument is more noteworthy for its appli-
cation to restricted omniscience views. 
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 All self-identities are in principle knowable to God, since self-identities 
are simply trivial logical truths and God knows all of those, no matter what. By 
our operational characterization of self-identities, moreover, all self-identities are 
devoid of the relevant indexical information. Given this, the following are equiv-
alent: 
(a) There is no set of all and only true self-identities 
(b) There is no set of all and only true self-identities that are knowable 
to God 
(c) There is no set of all and only true self-identities containing no infor-
mation essentially due to first-person indexicals  
(d) There is no set of all and only true self-identities containing no infor-
mation essentially due to temporal indexicals 
(a)-(d) can be extended, by trifling subset arguments, to target more familiar pu-
tative sets of propositions whose importance to restricted omniscience views is 
more obvious. First, there is no set of all true propositions that are knowable to 
God. For if there were, some subset of that set would be the mythical set of all 
and only true self-identities knowable to God. But there is no such set, and so 
neither is there any such set as its proper superset, the set of all truths knowable 
to God. So, K-Restricted Omniscience, insofar as it entails that there is a set of 
all truths God knows, is false. 
 By the same sorts of considerations, given the conclusion that there is no 
set of all and only true self-identities containing no information essentially due 
to first-person indexicals, we conclude that there is no set of all truths containing 
such information. For if there were, then some subset of that set would be the 
mythical set of all and only true self-identities containing no information essen-
tially due to first-person indexicals. There is no such set, and so neither is there 
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any such set as one of its would-be proper supersets, the set of all truths contain-
ing no information essentially due to first-person indexicals. So, I-Restricted Om-
niscience, insofar as it entails that there is a set of all truths God knows, is false. 
 Likewise for T-Restricted Omniscience: insofar as it entails that there is 
a set of all truths God knows, T-Restricted Omniscience is false. This much fol-
lows from the strengthened Grim-style argument above. 
 Therefore Grim-style set theoretic paradoxes afflict not only the classical 
doctrine of divine omniscience: just the same, open theism and restricted omnis-
cience views give rise to Grim-style set theoretic paradoxes. 
 
4.2 The Generalized Semantic Argument 
Where before our semantic argument turned on the assumption that God believes 
all truths and believes no falsehoods, this much is not available to us in the case 
of restricted omniscience. Neither can we assume the principle of bivalence—
nor its proof-theoretic correlate, the law of excluded middle. 
 All the same, given the resources for self-reference, we can run a more 
modest semantic argument against any view which, as open theism and restricted 
omniscience views all do, entails NO FALSE—the thesis, recall, that God believes 
no false propositions. This latter we will characterize by accepting as true any 
substitution instance of the following schema: 
(RO) God believes (⌜φ⌝) → φ 
This is simply the left-to-right direction of (O) above. We also assume that God 
knows all logical truths, which we take to be a component of open theism as well 
as the restricted omniscience views. This much we for present purposes codify 
as the following rule of proof: 
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 NEC: if φ is provable without any undischarged assumptions, infer God 
believes (⌜φ⌝) 
Given (RO) and the acceptability of NEC, we can likewise derive a contradiction. 
Given the resources for self-reference, we can have a Curryesque sentence β in 
our language such that the following holds: 
(β) β ↔ (God believes (⌜β⌝) → ⊥) 
(Where ⊥ is an arbitrary contradiction of our language.) This much facilitates the 
following argument: 
 1) God believes (⌜β⌝) → β     [Sub. (RO)]  
 2) God believes (⌜β⌝) → (God believes (⌜β⌝) →⊥) [1; (β)]  
 3) God believes (⌜β⌝) → ⊥    [2; Contr.]  
 4) β        [3; (β), MP]  
 5) God believes (⌜β⌝)     [4; NEC]  
 6) ⊥        [3, 5; MP]  
Grim’s semantic argument aimed to show that the classical doctrine, according 
to which any substitution instance of (O) is true, resulted in a sort of Liar-type 
paradox. This more modest argument shows that any view that vindicates all sub-
stitution instances of (RO) and validates NEC results in a Curry-like paradox.15 
Since the restricted omniscience views come with a commitment to NO 
FALSE, and the acceptability of all substitution instances of (RO) is simply our 
regimentation of NO FALSE, the restricted omniscience views on offer are just as 
well committed to the acceptability of all substitution instances of (RO). Simi-
larly, we take it that on the restricted omniscience views canvassed above God 
14 
 
believes all logical truths, and so we accordingly take these restricted omnisci-
ence views to entail the validity of NEC. So, the above argument targets restricted 
omniscience just as much as the original semantic argument targeted the classical 
doctrine. 
 As mentioned above, moreover, where the open theist will reject the orig-
inal semantic argument is with its dependence on the law of excluded middle. 
The above argument, though, makes no use of the law of excluded middle. Just 
so, then, the generalized semantic argument targets open theist views just as 
much as the original semantic argument targeted the classical doctrine. 
 
5. Implications of the Preceding 
As we indicated in §1, we decline to evaluate here whether or not Grim’s argu-
ments are successful against the classical doctrine of divine omniscience. This is 
the subject of much debate, and a position on this issue is beyond the scope of 
this short article.16 What has so far not been widely discussed is the way in which 
arguments very much like Grim’s apply just as well to alternative doctrines of 
omniscience—doctrines that are much less demanding than the classical doctrine. 
This much we have argued for in the foregoing sections. In particular, we have 
so far seen that Grim-style arguments can be advanced given strictly weaker as-
sumptions than those imposed upon us by the classical doctrine, and these more 
modest arguments apply not only to the classical doctrine but also and explicitly 
to open theism and various restricted omniscience views. 
 It might have been thought, antecedently, that Grim-style considerations 
could serve as reasons to adopt some alternative doctrine of omniscience. That 
is, for the theist, there might have been a temptation to argue as follows: 
P1 God is omniscient, at least in some sense. 
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P2 If God is omniscient, at least in some sense, then open theism, some 
restricted omniscience view, or the classical doctrine is true. 
P3 Grim-style arguments show that the classical doctrine of omniscience 
is not true. 
C Therefore, open theism or some restricted omniscience view is true. 
This is a fine argument. But an implication of what we have so far said is that 
this argument is unavailable to partisans of alternative doctrines of omniscience, 
since the parallel argument 
P1 God is omniscient, at least in some sense. 
P2 If God is omniscient, at least in some sense, then open theism, some 
restricted omniscience view, or the classical doctrine is true. 
P3* Grim-style arguments show that neither open theism nor some re-
stricted omniscience view is true. 
 C Therefore, the classical doctrine is true. 
is available to the advocate of the classical doctrine just the same, and what we 
have said in the preceding entails that the only premises differing between the 
two arguments—premises P3 and P3*—are on a par. So Grim-style considera-
tions cannot serve as a reason to prefer an alternative doctrine of divine omnisci-
ence to the classical doctrine. 
 Another obvious implication of the preceding is related: since Grim-style 
arguments afflict weaker views than the traditional doctrine, what leads to para-
doxes cannot be the classical doctrine just as such. Rather, what results in para-
dox must be some subterranean feature of the classical doctrine that the classical 
doctrine and its alternatives have in common. 
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 Finally, we take it that this subterranean feature of the classical doctrine 
that results in paradox is not its extraordinary entailments concerning how much 
God knows or concerning God’s knowledge of diverse and recherché subject 
matters. This may have been suggested by Grim’s arguments, as both assumed 
that God knows everything. As we have seen, though, similar paradoxes arise 
given more modest assumptions about what God knows. 
 In both of our generalized Grim-style arguments above, we need no such 
special assumption about the extent of God’s knowledge or about what sorts of 
truths God can know. That is, except for one: both arguments assume that God, 
no matter what, knows all logical truths. In fact, the set theoretic argument as-
sumes—at least explicitly—only that God knows all of a certain privileged class 
of logical truths. In more impressionistic terms, both generalized Grim-style ar-
guments build in assumptions that reflect the common view that God is in some 
sense a perfect logical reasoner. Given this, it is not at all surprising that more 
modest alternatives to the classical doctrine of omniscience do not avoid the par-
adoxes, since none of the alternatives to the classical doctrine qualify the logical 
perfection of God’s knowledge. 
 In conclusion, then, we say that the paradoxicality of divine omniscience, 
by the lights of Grim-style considerations, resides in a heretofore undertheorized 
feature of God’s knowledge: God’s status as a being of perfect rationality from a 
logical point of view.17 
 
University of Greifswald 
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NOTES 
1 Grim’s arguments can be found in his articles “Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience”, 
“There is No Set of All Truths,” “Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower,” “Logic and the Limits 
of Knowledge and Truth,” as well as in his book The Incomplete Universe. Some responses to 
Grim’s arguments can be found in Bringsjord, “Grim on Logic and Omniscience,” Mar, “Why 
‘Cantorian’ Arguments Against the Existence of God Do Not Work,” Simmons, “On an Argu-
ment Against Omniscience,” Plantinga and Grim, “Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Argu-
ments,” Beall, “A Neglected Response to the Grim Result,” and Cotnoir, “Theism and Dialethe-
ism.” 
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2 We assume, as stated, that this is an entailment of the classical doctrine. We by no means assume 
that this entailment just is the classical doctrine. There is an interesting question, which we here 
leave to the side, about the relationship between this entailment of the classical doctrine and 
scholastic characterizations of omniscience according to which the objects of God’s knowledge 
are existing particulars or God Himself rather than, for example, truth bearers.   
3 We here follow the formulation in Menzel, “Sets and Worlds Again,” of the Russellian Paradox 
of Propositions. This formulation does not appeal to Cantor’s theorem, in contrast to the formu-
lation in Grim, “There is No Set of All Truths.” Menzel points out the close connection between 
Grim’s argument and Russell’s argument in Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics. 
4 At least, that is, insofar as the classical doctrine entails that there is a set of all truths that God 
knows. 
5 What we call the semantic argument is Grim’s variant of the Liar Paradox, which appears in 
Grim, “Some Neglected Problems of Omniscience.” 
6 This is a realistic assumption, from a consideration of natural language. There plainly are un-
problematic sentences of natural-language that effect self-reference: this very sentence does, for 
example. For our purposes, we can in the usual way simply say that the language in which the 
above argument is formulated can arithmeticize its own syntax. 
7 The first argument assumed that the classical doctrine entails that God believes all true propo-
sitions and believes no false ones. The second assumed only that God believes that all true sen-
tences are true, and believes of no false ones that they are true. But, one might protest, these 
arguments do not actually target the same formulation of the doctrine of omniscience. This ob-
jection is beside the point. What we are concerned with is the first formulation, and the second 
one can plausibly enough be taken to be an approximation of the former in the sentential rather 
than the propositional idiom. Even if this latter is denied, it is obvious that the first formulation 
entails the second. That is,  
 
(⋆) God believes all and only true propositions only if God believes, of every true sentence, that 
it is true. 
 
What would a counterexample to (⋆) be? In order for (⋆) to be false, there would have to be a 
true sentence S that God did not believe to be true. But there cannot be such a sentence, if the 
antecedent of (⋆) is satisfied. For S is true only if (a) S expresses some true proposition p and (b) 
S is true iff p is. But, then, since S is true, p likewise is true (by (b)), and so God believes that p 




                                                                                                                                  
iff p is. So God does believe that S is true, which contradicts our supposition that S is a true 
sentence that God does not believe to be true. Thus, the first formulation entails the second. For 
these reasons, any argument against the second we take to be an argument against the first.  
8 See Lucas, The Future, Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” and the two articles by Zim-
merman, “The A-Theory of Time” and “Open Theism and the Metaphysics of the Space-Time 
Manifold.” For the sake of brevity, we are here being free with attaching an idiosyncratically 
narrow extension to “open theism.” As is plain from the above discussion, we are here assuming 
that open theism constitutively involves denying the principle of bivalence. This excludes open 
theists who accept bivalence (see Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” for a critical discus-
sion), and it in particular excludes those open theists who adopt a metaphysics of time according 
to which future contingents are all false (see Todd, “Future Contingents are all False!”) This is 
harmless in what follows. Since bivalent open theism does not differ from the classical doctrine 
as regards the two issues of importance here—viz., bivalence and ALL TRUE—we can for present 
purposes regard bivalent open theism as a version of the classical doctrine. Of course, by this do 
not mean to venture an evaluation of the orthodoxy or theological pedigree of bivalent open the-
ism.  
9 And, of course, by rejecting the unqualified version of ALL TRUE.  
10 As formulated, these instances of AT-SCHEMA might be stronger than what is required by some 
relevant theorists. However, clearly the generalizations of Grim’s arguments below apply just as 
well to views less restrictive than those broadly described here. 
11 See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, “A Philosophical Perspective,” and Providence, Evil 
and the Openness of God; Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, and van Inwagen, “What Does 
an Omniscient Being Know About the Future?” 
12 See Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immutability,” and Grim, “Against Omniscience.” 
13 See Prior, “The Formalities of Omniscience,” Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immutability,” 
Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, and Grim, “Against Omniscience.” 
14 We do not claim that a rejection of the law of excluded middle suffices to block the simple Liar 
paradox. We simply note that our version of the semantic argument assumes the law of excluded 
middle, which we assume the open theist will reject. We are thankful to a referee for encouraging 
us to emphasize this point. 
15 The argument is informally presented in natural deduction given the legitimacy of the rule of 
contraction used at line 3: the rule, that is, stating that φ → φ' can be inferred from φ → (φ → φ'). 
Yet, a similar argument in Hilbert-style could be presented by simply adding the logical theorem 




                                                                                                                                  
2.1) (God believes (⌜β⌝) → (God believes (⌜β⌝) → ⊥)) → (God believes (⌜β⌝) → ⊥) 
 
and then inferring line 3 from 2 and 2.1 by modus ponens. The argument here in fact establishes 
a version of Montague’s Paradox, i.e. the claim that any theory T in the first-order language of 
arithmetic enriched with a unary predicate satisfying (RO) and NEC, such that T ⊇ Q, where Q is 
Robinson’s arithmetic, is inconsistent. However, the present argument, in contradistinction with 
Montague’s, does not make use of a Liar-like sentence. Kaplan and Montague, “A Paradox Re-
gained,” first mentioned that a similar result could be obtained when the predicate in question is 
taken (intuitively) to represent knowledge (that is, the Knower Paradox). Analogous incon-
sistency proofs but under different axioms have been shown in Thomason, “A Note on Syntactical 
Treatments of Modality,” and McGee, “How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be?” 
 It is worth mentioning that, as has just been hinted at, some of the authors referenced 
above have drawn connections between arguments like that given above and the notion of 
knowledge, to which omniscience is obviously related. Thomason, for example, draws morals 
from Montague’s paradox against Hintikka’s account of idealized knowledge as well as theories 
of content suggested by Fodor and others. The considerations we raise here differ from those 
otherwise gestured at in the literature insofar as we make clear how theological alternatives to the 
classical doctrine of omniscience exhibit the logical problems that Grim claims for the classical 
doctrine. Grim himself connects paradoxes similar to Montague’s (i.e. the Knower) with the clas-
sical doctrine, though not with weaker extant alternatives to the classical doctrine (see Grim, 
“Truth, Omniscience, and the Knower,” and also Grim, The Incomplete Universe). The main 
purpose of the present generalization of the semantic argument is precisely that of making such 
connections explicit, and an advantage of the present argument to that end consists in its being 
essentially independent of issues concerning negation and the law of excluded middle.  
16 In Lampert and Waldrop “The Paradoxes of Omniscience” we offer our preferred solution to 
the paradoxical problems posed by the semantic argument, which converges with a solution to 
the set theoretic argument suggested in Beall, “A Neglected Response to the Grim Result.” A 
recent proposal regarding God’s relationship to the set theoretic universe which suggests a re-
sponse to the set theoretic argument is Christopher Menzel’s theological activism, as developed 
in Menzel, “The Argument from Collections.”  
17 Many thanks to the editor and two anonymous reviewers at Faith and Philosophy for helpful 
comments and encouraging feedback. 
